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he new conventional wisdom is that network utilities should be
unbundled, with the potentially competitive segments under separate
ownership from the natural monopoly network. Regulation should provide the
same incentives as the competitive market, differing sharply from the
traditional rate-of-return form evolved in the United States. But the new
model has problems. Unbundling creates new price risks that require hedging.
The consequences of the risks and resulting hedging contracts are often not
well understood by regulators. The conditions for effective competition, at
least in electricity, are considerably more demanding than in normal product
markets. Competition law may need to be adapted to be effective.
The three network utilities where competition appears attractive –
telecoms, gas, and electricity – present different challenges. In telecoms, the
choice between facilities-based competition and access price regulation is still
finely balanced. In gas, particularly on the Continent, finding a satisfactory
equilibrium that addresses import security and competition concerns is at an
early stage. Electricity provides the best evidence of the consequences of
unbundling, and provides the sharpest test of the new conventional wisdom. 
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If we look back two decades, we would see two apparently very different
ways of managing the network utilities of gas, telecoms and electricity. The
United States was unusual in that these were mainly in private or investor
ownership operating as vertically integrated franchise monopolies. They were
regulated both by state public utility commissions and federal agencies under
rate-of-return regulation. This system of regulation had evolved over the
previous century to protect both consumer and investor interests by setting
prices or rates that were “just and reasonable”. The potentially exploitative
power of these private monopolies was restrained by price regulation, while
the political power of mass voting consumers to expropriate sunk assets was
restrained by constitutional protection of private property. The franchise
monopoly is the quid pro quo for the obligation to meet demand, and provides
the means to finance the necessary investment.
The UK, along with much of the rest of the world, also operated these
utilities as vertically integrated franchise monopolies. Prices were held at
reasonable levels in response to consumer political pressure, but public owner-
ship substituted for constitutional protection of private property to guarantee
investment in durable sunk capital (Newbery, 2000).
The two different forms of ownership and regulation were similar in the
structure and stability of the industrial form. Public ownership had much in
common with cost-of-service regulation, with the public paymasters paying as
little attention to incentives as the US utility commissioners. Economists
criticised rate-of-return regulation for its poor incentives and gold-plating.
British economists criticised the nationalised industries for low productivity,
expensive investment, and lack of response to consumer demand, notably the
long waiting lists for telephone connection.
Perhaps by coincidence, 1984 marked the beginning of the end of this
stable configuration on both sides of the Atlantic. The break-up of the tele-
phone giant AT&T in the United States and the privatisation of British
Telecom (BT) in Britain marked the start of utility liberalisation. The seeds of
the break-up of AT&T were planted when new entrants attempted to compete
on the over-priced long distance routes that state regulators relied on to cross-
subsidise local rates. In 1974 the Department of Justice filed suit against
AT&T for monopolising interstate communications. It became clear that
regulating an industry with competitive and natural monopoly elements in a
federal system with divided regulatory responsibilities was unsustainable. In
1982, AT&T decided to divest the local Bell Operating Companies, leaving
AT&T with the competitive long-distance lines, vertically unbundling the US
telecoms industry.
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Conservative Party’s belief that “the business of Government is not the
government of business” than a desire to liberalise. Regulation was clearly
necessary for such a powerful private monopoly and Stephen Littlechild was
asked to advise on its form. Taking to heart criticisms of rate-of-return
regulation, he proposed the now familiar RP1-X price-cap formula, where X is
the predicted rate of productivity increase (real telecoms prices had been
falling steadily). Littlechild (1983) saw price-caps as a transitional form of
regulation until competition took over the task of holding down retail prices.
The banks appreciated the predictability that RPI-X gave to future revenue
streams, on the basis of which the privatisation prospectus could be written.
Across the Atlantic, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) realised
that rate-of-return regulation was too cumbersome to deal with a dominant
incumbent firm facing competitive threats from entrants. They too gradually
adopted price-cap regulation.
If forms of regulation started to converge, the motives for reform on each
side of the Atlantic were initially quite different. The emphasis in Britain was
on ending state ownership, not on liberalisation, and BT was privatised as a
de facto monopoly. In short order, British Gas was privatised as a vertically
integrated monopoly in 1986, and the ten water and sewerage companies were
privatised as vertically integrated regional monopolies in 1989.
Economists pointed out that privatisation was not the same as
liberalisation, and that the main benefits from restructuring network utilities
would flow from competition, not the change of ownership (Vickers and
Yarrow, 1988). When electricity was proposed for privatisation, it was decided
that it should be unbundled to allow competition. The results were encourag-
ing – the industry was successfully sold, shareholders did well, consumers felt
no pain, and, crucially, the lights stayed on. Regulatory pressure on British
Gas, as on AT&T, encouraged that company to unbundle and divest its pipeline
business, while a new Gas Act ended the gas franchise in 1998 and made
supply as well as production competitive and largely unregulated. The
domestic electricity franchise ended in 1999.
The old vertically integrated utility model no longer looked like a desirable
or even inevitable equilibrium form. Technical progress had unsettled
telecoms, changing the set of feasible stable equilibria. Facilities-based
competition from cable, internet, wireless and other media became possible.
Whether local loop unbundling is superior to facilities-based competition for
the delivery of broadband remains controversial.
The case of natural gas is less clear, and the old structure may not even
have been a sustainable equilibrium. Large-scale commercial exploitation of
natural gas is a relatively recent phenomenon. Between 1970 and 2000,
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of US consumption to 70 per cent (BP, 2000). Gas production and transmission
is capital-intensive, and normally financed in the private sector on the back of
long-term contracts. Once the network is mature and the market developed,
this equilibrium is vulnerable to regulatory opportunism, clearly demon-
strated in the US and Britain (Newbery, 2000). That does not mean that an
unbundled gas industry is an inevitable outcome. The Continent is heavily
and increasingly dependent on gas imports, mostly from politically unstable
and distant countries. Britain and the US are almost alone in being self-
sufficient and having fully restructured their industries. Other countries see
gas imports as of major geopolitical concern, and are most unlikely to allow the
industry to evolve solely in response to market forces. A competitive
downstream industry may not be the ideal complement to an upstream foreign
monopoly such as Gazprom. 
III RESTRUCTURING ELECTRICITY 
The development of combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) makes this the
natural choice for new generation. They are cheap, of modest scale and quick
to build, making generation more contestable, facilitating competition. Even
traditional generation stations are small compared to the typical market:
economies of scale of coal and nuclear stations fall off rapidly beyond 2 per cent
of total UK capacity. Smaller countries like Belgium are typically inter-
connected with a wider system, leaving only isolated small countries like
Ireland facing a serious problem of indivisibility. Competition in generation
therefore looks attractive.
UK electricity reform provides an excellent example of the benefits of
restructuring and the importance of structural decisions. The UK tried all
three possible models: in England and Wales the Central Electricity Generat-
ing Board (CEGB) was unbundled into three generating companies and the
grid, the 12 distribution companies were privatised, and a wholesale market –
the Electricity Pool – created. Scotland retained the two incumbent vertically
integrated companies with minimal restructuring and constrained export
links to England. Northern Ireland adopted the Single Buyer model with the
combined transmission/distribution company NIE holding long-term power
purchase agreements (PPAs) with the three independent generating
companies.
Newbery and Pollitt (1997) and Pollitt (1997, 1998) present social cost-
benefit analyses of the three models, with striking and intuitively plausible
results. The restructuring of the CEGB immediately introduced daily com-
petitive price bidding for each power station. All generating companies
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owned Nuclear Electric. The social benefits amounted to a permanent
reduction of costs of 6 per cent compared to the counterfactual – a 100 per cent
return on the sales price. These benefits were almost entirely captured by
companies, for profits rose as costs fell and prices remained stubbornly high
until continued and aggressive regulatory intervention forced extensive
divestment of capacity. By 2001 the dominant duopoly had evolved into a
relatively unconcentrated industry. Entrants and incumbents operated
efficient CCGT stations, a range of international generating companies bought
divested plant, and the modern nuclear stations had been privatised.
Scotland was a different story. In 1990 electricity prices were 10 per cent
lower than in England, but lack of competition led to prices some 5 per cent
higher by 2000. The very modest benefits of privatisation were counter-
balanced by restructuring costs, delivering no net benefit. Northern Ireland
gives a mixed picture. The long-term PPAs provided powerful incentives for
increased plant availability and cost reductions, outperforming the CEGB by
a factor of three, but the companies retained the benefits. Aggressive price
reductions on the non-generating elements, combined with Government
subsidies, somewhat reduced the embarrassing price gap with Britain.
The lessons are clear. Increased competition is needed to reduce costs and
that requires separating generation from transmission and distribution. To
pass these on to consumers requires a sufficient number of competitors and an
open access wholesale market. Unrestructured industries, even if privatised,
appear to deliver few benefits. The evidence suggests that regulators have to
work hard to transfer efficiency gains in transmission and distribution into
lower consumer prices (Domah and Pollitt, 2000). They need to take positive
steps to counteract market power in the potentially competitive sectors,
including capacity divestment, if consumers are to gain.
The lesson that unbundling is necessary has been taken to heart by the
European Union. Vertical separation, preferably of ownership, is recognised as
the preferred model, although the EU requires only legal separation in the
proposed new Energy Directive. There is less agreement on the design of
electricity markets (and the Directive is not prescriptive on this). The single-
price English Pool model has found favour abroad, but was replaced by the
New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) in 2001 to reduce claimed tacit
collusion keeping prices too high.
IV THREATS TO THE NEW CONSENSUS
The argument of this paper is that there is unfinished business in
managing the combination of competition and regulation that follows from
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sustainable regulation that combines the efficiency benefits of competition
with the proper management of risk and adequate investment. The central
question is whether the unbundled structure is sustainable or whether the old
equilibrium of vertically integrated franchise monopolies is the only stable
equilibrium. 
A few years ago, such questions would have been considered heretical.
Structural unbundling had been demonstrated successful in Britain and
elsewhere. Impressed by the achievements of that model, the European
Commission introduced liberalising Directives for electricity and gas.
(Bergman,  et al., 1999). These enforced functional unbundling, opened
networks to Third Parties to allow competition between producers, and opened
one-third of final demand to competitive supply.
With unfortunate timing, recent events in California have shaken political
confidence in liberalisation. California led the United States in unbundling
electricity, expecting prices to fall as they had done in Britain, Australia,
Norway and Argentina. Instead, wholesale prices trebled between 1999 and
2000, bankrupting the distribution companies whose retail prices were
capped. The European Commission issued a press release arguing for 
more rapid opening of European energy markets. “Thanks to these new
measures, the European Union, unlike the United States, will have a truly
integrated market, which means, for instance, that Europe will avoid the type
of problems currently faced by California, which have resulted from an
inadequate legal framework and inadequate production capacity.” (At
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/en/internal-market/int-market.html).
In Britain, the travails of the extensively unbundled railway system (over
100 companies created out of the former British Rail) culminated in the
Hatfield rail accident which killed four people – one-third of the number of
daily road deaths – but which disrupted the entire railway network for the
next six months. The comfortable political assumption that utilities could be
removed from the political arena, able to finance their activities while
delivering lower prices to contented voting consumers, had been undermined.
The British government responded by putting in place the Strategic Rail
Authority to sort out the railways, and the Prime Minister’s office launched an
energy review. 
V PROBLEMS OF REPLACING REGULATION BY COMPETITION
The mantra “competition where feasible, regulation where not” suggests
that regulation should be confined to the natural monopoly elements, typically
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elements still need regulatory oversight to ensure that markets are not
manipulated nor market power abused. The UK 1998 Competition Act,
therefore, grants the Office of Fair Trading joint powers with regulators to
deal with utility competition issues. Setting price caps to transfer past
efficiency gains is reasonably straightforward, though it is harder to provide
incentives for efficient and adequate capacity investment.
A substantial part of UK regulatory activity over the past few years has
been directed to introducing competition, or intervening to improve
competitive outcomes. Ending the franchise in electricity and gas was an
example of the former, encouraging plant divestment and reforming electricity
trading arrangements directed to the latter. NETA was introduced to reduce
the perceived abuse of market power. The ill-fated Market Abuse Licence
Condition introduced by Ofgem, contested by British Energy and AES, then
referred to the Competition Commission and rejected, was an attempt to
restrain supposed abuses that would not be reliably caught by the Competition
Act (Competition Commission, 2000).
The United States, with its more legalistic approach, is much clearer on
the duties of regulators when liberalising. Under the Federal Power Act 1935,
FERC has a statutory obligation to ensure that wholesale prices are “just and
reasonable”. If an electric utility wishes to sell at market-determined whole-
sale prices, this will only be allowed providing the utility “and each of its
affiliates does not have, or has adequately mitigated, market power in
generation and transmission and cannot erect other barriers to entry.”1 Even
then, the authority to sell at market-determined prices can be withdrawn and
replaced by regulated prices if there is “any change in status that would reflect
a departure from the characteristics the Commission has relied upon in
approving market-based pricing.”2 Legally, competitive pricing is considered
“just and reasonable”. The reason that FERC is so concerned to ensure that
prices remain competitive is that any FERC-approved form of pricing greatly
restricts the competition authorities from intervening. At the same time,
existing antitrust laws are relatively powerless to enforce competitive
outcomes in the energy industry as “the antitrust laws do not outlaw the mere
possession of monopoly power that is the result of skill, accident, or a previous
regulatory regime. … Antitrust remedies are thus not well-suited to address
problems of market power in the electric power industry that result from
existing high levels of concentration in generation.” (DOE, 2000; Bogorad and
Penn, 2001).
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their different histories. Deregulation in the United States was a cautious
relaxation of regulatory control over prices, concerned with the potential
problems of market power. Electricity restructuring in Europe has concen-
trated on creating markets, expecting them to be competitive. The dictum of
confining regulation to natural monopolies has often resulted in too little
attention to undesirable concentration in generation. Many EU countries lack
the necessary powers to ensure that generation becomes adequately competi-
tive. The Commission’s confidence that Europe’s reforms will avoid
Californian problems may be justified in the short run, as capacity is
adequate, though there are threats of market power emerging in some
countries. Good regulation must be robust against possible future problems, to
which this paper now turns. 
VI THE CALIFORNIAN EXAMPLE
California liberalised its electricity because of dissatisfaction with high
consumer prices. However, average wholesale prices in 2000 were more than
three times those of 1999, and 2001 started with rolling blackouts, stage 3
alerts,3 and the major public utility, PG&E, filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection. California shows that poor market design coupled with
inappropriate regulatory and political intervention, can rapidly produce
extremely unsatisfactory outcomes when capacity is tight, particularly if the
shortages are unexpected. California has certainly alarmed European
politicians and caused energy specialists to reconsider the merits of
deregulation. To cite the pseudonymous Price C Watts (2001) “It is clear that
deregulation is a high-risk choice. Those jurisdictions that have not yet
deregulated electricity generation need to think long and hard before they go
ahead. Those that have done so need to figure out how to minimise the
downside potential of the journey on which they have embarked.”
What were the various contributory factors to this unhappy outcome?
First, California (and the neighbouring states) had under-invested in
generation, partly because of disputes over nuclear power plant costs and
safety, environmental objections, and misconceived long-term Power Purchase
Agreements (PPAs) with Qualifying Facilities, QFs, typically owned by “non-
utility generators”. This was sustainable because California imported
extensively from the Pacific Northwest, making use of the apparently
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Second, after unbundling, distribution companies were strongly dissuaded
from signing long-term contracts for electricity or hedging. This regulatory
restraint was a response to earlier excessively-priced PPAs from the QFs. The
Public Utility Commission recognised the spot market price as the principal
measure of wholesale electricity costs, and utilities were required to trade all
their power through the Power Exchange (PX).4
Finally, NOx emissions were capped by region (and in some cases by plant)
on an annual basis. In the (not particularly) hot summer of 2000, gas demand
for generation greatly increased, but pipeline capacity and storage were
frequently inadequate to meet the demand. Californian gas spot prices more
than doubled (coming on top of high prices caused by the doubling of crude oil
prices), as did the contract prices from many QFs, that were indexed to gas
prices.5 The price of tradable NOx permits also rose to $80,000/ton at their
peak, compared with $400/ton on the East Coast (Laurie, 2001). Electricity
prices rose, not just in California, but in the whole western interconnection in
which power is traded. Thus the average price for the whole year at the Mid-
Columbia hub north of California was $137/MWh compared with $27/MWh in
1999, higher than the California PX average of $91/MWh. California’s largest
distribution companies were unable to pass on the high wholesale prices,
precipitating bankruptcy.
High plant utilisation in the summer and autumn induced by high spot
prices necessitated greater scheduled maintenance downtime in the normally
quieter winter period. A dry winter in the Columbia Basin lowered hydro
output and cold weather increased demand, which together caused a severe
energy shortage, higher prices, defaults, and bankruptcy. Inept price caps
caused generators to export, rather than sell in California, while the non-
utility generators refused to supply for fear of not being paid. The repeated
interventions of the State Governor arguably made the situation worse, as
threatened seizures, price caps, and regulatory hurdles prejudiced investment
in generation. Poorly designed trading arrangements, with caps on some
markets that encouraged participants to under-contract in the day-ahead
market and diverted power to the real-time market at very high prices
amplified market power (Wolak and Nordhaus, 2000).
What are the lessons from the Californian experience? First, tight
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high prices even when fairly competitive (four generating companies setting
prices at the margin). As demand tightens relative to supply, inelastic and
unresponsive demand6 means that large price rises have little effect on
demand, but each supplier has increasing and eventually substantial market
power. The large increase in price caused by any single company reducing
supply more than compensates for the foregone profits, making such
withdrawals profitable in tight markets.
Second, any transition from a vertically integrated utility to an unbundled
structure introduces price risks between generators and suppliers that
previously cancelled out. High wholesale selling prices for generators gives
profits upstream that are matched by the losses of downstream suppliers who
have to buy at these high wholesale prices and sell at predetermined retail
prices, unless these purchases are hedged by contracts. An unbundled
industry therefore needs hedging contracts to insure against shocks to spot
prices, particularly when suppliers sell at fixed prices. The British
privatisation was accompanied by three-year contracts for both the sale of
electricity and purchase of fuel to reduce transitional risks.
Third, in an interconnected system operating under a variety of different
regulatory and operational jurisdictions, spare capacity is a public good that
may be under-supplied unless adequately remunerated. Fourth, it is even
harder for a decentralised market under multiple jurisdictions to ensure
adequate reserve capacity with a potentially energy-constrained hydroelectric
system, particularly where reservoir storage is limited, and annual water
volume variations are high. Finally, injudicious local regulatory interventions
in an interconnected system can have perverse effects, and damage inter-
regional electricity trade (Wolak and Nordhaus, 2000; 2001).
VII ELECTRICITY PRICE DETERMINATION IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE
Electricity has distinctive features that profoundly influence price
formation. Electricity cannot be easily stored, supply must be instantaneously
matched to demand, transmission constraints require active systems
balancing, and demand is highly inelastic in the short run over which daily
price variations occur (where the peak price may be 100 times as high as the
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direct control over at least some plant, creating important differences with
other commodity markets, even gas. 
Modelling price formation to understand market power is both challenging
and important for informed regulation. Green and Newbery (1992) modelled
the English Electricity Pool by adapting Klemperer and Meyer’s (1989) supply
function equilibrium (SFE) model. This approach is both natural and
empirically supported for a single-price gross pool like the English Pool. The
model is challenging to solve and typically gives a range of possible
equilibrium prices.
Auction models have been proposed, and are useful for comparing single
price and pay-bid trading arrangements, but are even less tractable.7
Standard Cournot oligopoly models are simpler, can be defended in tight
market conditions, but suggest a more deterministic outcome than supply
function models with their range of indeterminacy. More sophisticated price-
formation models capture strategic aspects and the non-convexities of start-up
costs, which can dramatically influence short-run marginal cost. Despite this
apparent diversity, theory and evidence suggest considerable agreement about
the nature of the resulting equilibrium. Competition is more intense (closer to
Bertrand) and prices closer to avoidable costs with spare available capacity,
but as the margin of available capacity decreases, competition becomes less
intense and outcomes closer to Cournot (as in the SFE). Contracts lock in
prices and reduce the influence of spot prices on generator revenue, making
the relevant market size that for uncontracted output. The dominant short-
run strategy for a fully contracted generator is to bid short-run avoidable cost
(Newbery, 1995). The threat of entry by competitive generators limits the
average price that can be sustained and encourages incumbents to contract
and bid to maximise profits without inducing excess entry. Peak prices depend
on the relation between maximum demand and maximum available capacity.
The returns to peaking plant depend on the prices reached and the number of
hours for which they are paid. Inelastic demand8 means that in tight markets
even apparently unconcentrated generation (HHI < 1800), can sustain
extremely high price-cost margins. The wide range of equilibrium price
strategies may make the threat of regulatory intervention effective, while
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argument for replacing the Pool).
Green and Newbery (1992) argued that the restructuring of the CEGB into
two price-setting generating companies gave too much market power to the
incumbents, and, on the basis of a demand elasticity of 0.2,9 argued that
dividing the generation capacity among five equal size firms would be highly
pro-competitive. This conclusion, which appeared to be influential in
restructuring the Victoria electricity market in Australia, seemed to be borne
out by the evidence of significant price falls there, compared to apparently
excessive price-cost margin in England. We were arguably too sanguine about
demand elasticities – halving the elasticity of demand (at some reference
price, quantity pair) would double the peak price-cost margin reached, cet.
par.10 Newbery (1998) argued that the conditions of entry and the extent of
contract coverage were both critical in determining the average price level and
its volatility, so that other things would not remain constant if demand
elasticities changed. Market power depends on concentration and demand
conditions (both of which may be significantly affected by inter-regional trade),
but also on entry and contracting conditions, which tend to be overlooked.
If incumbents can ignore entry and regulatory threats, then their logical
strategy is to merge to increase market power, and close plant to credibly
tighten the margin of spare capacity. Incumbents owning transmission can
deter entry by capturing all capacity rents to generation and transmission in
access charges to the grid, as in Germany (Brunekreeft, 2002).
If entry is relatively low risk, and there is adequate capacity within the
industry, then incumbents benefit from bidding to keep average prices below
the entry-inducing price.11 Newbery (1998) showed that the annual average
price would then be relatively insensitive to the number of competitive
incumbents, but price volatility would be lower the more competitive the
industry, provided the entry price remained unchanged with increasing
competition. The entry price may, however, be higher the more competitive the
industry, for the following reason. Future demand growth is uncertain, plant
highly durable, and investment decisions irreversible. The more competitive
the industry, the lower the prices will be if demand has been over-estimated.
Less competitive markets would sustain a higher price-cost margin even with
excess capacity, and reduce the risks of over-estimating demand. Electricity
generation is similar to aluminium smelting in that the avoidable costs are
typically only about half the total cost. The aluminium market is characterised
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demand gradually increases until the market tightens and prices rise to
extraordinarily high levels (Baldursson, 1999). These prices remain high until
the option value of delaying investment to resolve uncertainty about future
demand is adequately rewarded. At that point entry occurs, prices fall, and the
(long-period) price cycle restarts. Consequently, competitive and contestable
electricity markets may produce unacceptable price volatility, not just in the
short run (where contracts would eliminate the impact), but for possibly
lengthy periods before new capacity comes on-line, as in California.
The tensions suggested by this scenario may be resolved in various ways.
Incumbents will try to impede entry. Horizontal consolidation facilitates
multi-market contact that may mute competition (Parker and Röller, 1997).
Reforms to trading arrangements may affect entry conditions. There are
serious concerns that the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) in
Britain have concentrated excessively on improving short-run competition at
the expense of longer-run contestability of entry, while extensive vertical
integration into supply protects incumbents from price risk, makes markets
less liquid and creating additional barriers to entry. The resulting equilibrium
might be a quasi-regulated (or price-capped) oligopoly as regulators respond to
pressures for “just and reasonable” prices.12
An alternative is for regulatory intervention to support competitive
markets while reducing some of their adverse side effects. If competition and
future demand uncertainty increase medium-run price risk, there are two
compounding effects leading to inadequate capacity on average and hence
higher than efficient prices. The first is the incentive to delay in the presence
of price uncertainty. The second is more serious and derives from a market and
regulatory failure in the treatment of price risk. Britain in 2001 after a
sustained period of falling energy prices, had 20 per cent of households defined
as fuel poor – that it is spending more than 10 per cent of their income on fuel.
Average market-clearing final prices for electricity in periods of scarcity could
easily be twice or three times as high as normal average prices. Given the
considerable price and income inelasticity of demand for electricity, a large
number of consumers would be highly price-risk averse to long-period price
volatility. As most governments accept a universal service obligation as a
political necessity, generators would not expect that market clearing prices
would be allowed to reach such high levels except for very short periods
handled by normal contracts. Consequently, entrants will mark down the
expected returns in periods of scarcity, but will still be faced with lower
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under-invest relative to the efficient level of capacity, raising average prices.
If the system operator (SO) is instructed by the regulator to ensure
adequate reserves and has the right incentives to make timely forecasts of
demand and capacity adequacy, then the SO might need to contract for long-
term reserves. This would have the advantage of reducing the risks of
occasionally-run plant.13 This is not without problems, as spare capacity
drives down average prices, reducing the incentive to either enter or keep
capacity available without guaranteed payments from the SO or some other
source. One simple solution is to require the SO to secure adequate capacity,
thereby effectively making him a Single Buyer. A second solution is to retain
a franchise for domestic consumers and require that the franchise-holder
secures long-term contracts to meet his service obligations. Eligible customers
would be free to hold firm long-term contracts, or accept interruptible priority
tariffs.
Neither of these options is particularly attractive to those who believe that
liberalised markets can evolve fully decentralised solutions. It even suggests
that the old vertically integrated structure may after all be a preferable model.
Consider its advantages: in well managed, mature industrial economies cost
inefficiencies appear modest – of the order of 5 per cent or so (Newbery and
Pollitt, 1997). Regulated cost-based prices combined with vertical integration
eliminate the price risks on intermediate wholesale markets, and are the
regulatory quid pro quo to the requirement that the utility plans capacity to
meet its service obligation. The bias towards under-investment is replaced by
a bias to over-investment in which the excess costs can be recovered, ideally
by Ramsey pricing. Thus large industrial consumers face efficient prices
(short-run marginal cost), and any revenue short-fall can be recovered by
higher prices for commercial and domestic customers. This describes the
CEGB and EdF, although the US system of regulation was less able to sustain
efficient cross-subsidies in the face of a politicised regulatory rate-setting
process. Most industrial countries had substantial excess electricity capacity
after the 1974 oil shock but were able to protect their financial viability until
the collapse of the regulatory compact in the 1990s.
The Single Buyer model has the apparent attraction of introducing
competition into generation (for, not in the market), while retaining the risk
reduction and planning benefits of vertical integration. The buyer normally
owns the grid, allowing him to charge cost-recovering prices. Competition is
for the right to build plant, while the long-term power purchase agreements
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generation. Eligible customers can be left free to contract directly for surplus
power but at market determined prices, while the franchise customers have no
choice but to accept the long-term contract prices. The model is vulnerable to
regulatory opportunism that risks stranding these long-term contracts. The
EU Electricity Directive reinforced this risk by making the model functionally
equivalent to regulated Third Party Access, allowing eligible buyers to bypass
the Single Buyer. It has therefore fallen out of favour and the Commission
proposes to remove it as an option (CEC, 2001).
The critical question is whether it is possible to evolve a sustainable
unbundled equilibrium that transfers the benefits of competition to consumers
without risking politically unacceptable high prices and capacity shortages.
Theory and evidence alike suggests that this will require a relatively
unconcentrated wholesale generation industry, with no ownership interests in
transmission and no artificial or market-induced impediments to entry by new
competitors. The choice of wholesale market design remains problematic –
single-price pools may be prone to collusion, but pay-bid residual balancing
markets (as under NETA) amplify risk for non-portfolio generators and may
deter entry. Transmission constraints fragment markets and reduce the
number of generators able to compete against each other.
As even quite unconcentrated markets are prone to market power, there
are considerable competition and hence social benefits from “excess”
transmission capacity to maximise the geographical extent of the market.
Similarly, “excess” generation capacity keeps the equilibrium closer to
Bertrand competition but requires a mechanism to pay for capacity.14 Capacity
has public good-like qualities, in that it increases security, reliability, and
competition, all of which benefit consumers connected to the system. If the
system is also interconnected with other jurisdictions, then spare generation
capacity will improve their security and tempt them to free ride. The EU is
still searching for a viable way to finance additional interconnection to
improve competition.
Within a single country, these spill-overs can be internalised, although
only with careful regulatory design. Price-caps for transmission risk under-
investment unless security and market broadening are recognised as valuable
by the regulator and the transmission company is given incentives for its
adequate provision. In Britain, Ofgem is attracted to the idea of extending
competition to the provision of transport capacity, particularly in gas, and
considers that auctions for entry capacity and possibly for transmission should
guide investment decisions. Again, the problem is a mismatch of contract
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an effective life of 50 years. Auctions work well for allocating scarce existing
capacity, but are of doubtful value for signalling the amount of new capacity
required, especially given the public good benefits of increased competition.
Compensating for the tendency to under-invest in generation requires the
equivalent of a two-part tariff, with a capacity and energy element (one-sided
contracts for differences have a similar structure).15 This is easy with the
Single Buyer model, but more difficult if all consumers are free to switch
suppliers and strand contracts. This can be solved – savings markets offer
customers the choice between liquid less attractive contracts, and more
attractive contracts with exit penalties (for savings bonds, mortgages etc). The
practical question is whether the advantages of supply competition for
domestic customers justifies the extra costs and risks needed to avoid such
problems. Green and McDaniel (1998) cast doubt on whether this was the case
in Britain.
Matters are more complicated when electricity trade crosses country or
regulatory borders, as in the EU and US. The US has the advantage that
FERC has the legal power to intervene when prices are deemed “unjust and
unreasonable”, as it did in California (Wolak, 2001). The EU lacks that power,
and many EU countries lack even the requirement that generators hold
licences whose conditions can be modified to address market power issues.
VIII CONCLUSIONS
Unbundling creates risks that require suitable hedging contracts. Supply
competition shortens contract length and may prejudice long-term investment
in generation. Regulators are learning that competition is more fragile and
prone to manipulation in electricity markets than normal (storable) product
markets, but are unsure how to react. The US tradition in which FERC retains
the power to suspend market-based pricing when it is “unjust and
unreasonable” reflects a very different tradition to that motivating liberalisa-
tion elsewhere. The US tradition may either reflect a century of regulatory
capture, or the evolutionarily stable outcome of the political process. If market
liberalisation is the goal, rather than the means to a regulatory end, then
regulators and competition authorities will need the help of economists to
address these problems.
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payment. Vázquez, Rivier and Pérez-Arriaga (2001) suggest this as a means of securing capacity
adequacy and present the formula to compute the value of C.
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distinguish between pro-competitive and anti-competitive contracts. The
nature of trading arrangements and forms of contracting, particularly with
final consumers, will affect the conditions of entry that are critical to passing
efficiency gains through to consumers. Future demand will remain unpredict-
able, as will the weather in hydro systems. Investment decisions will therefore
remain risky, but the consequences for price risk depend very much on
industrial structure and contract coverage. At present most developed
countries enjoy the benefits of cheap gas combined with rapid-build efficient
CCGT technology, but if gas prices rise and coal and/or nuclear power becomes
economically attractive, planning time-lags will amplify the risks of capacity
investment and raise prices.
Vertically integrated franchise monopolies are an attractive and simple
way of reducing the price risks associated with capacity miscalculations.
Finding suitable contracts to replace this structure is conceptually possible,
but we lack demonstrated examples, at least without a domestic franchise.
Regulators have yet to find a reliable and robust form of incentive regulation
that delivers adequate capacity for transmission and reserves. Liberalised
markets require greater spare capacity to work efficiently than tightly
managed vertically integrated electricity systems. The benefits of competition
are real, but not very large. The critical question is whether the extra costs –
of spare capacity, of creating new market trading arrangements and the risk
of power-cuts – will outweigh these benefits.
In federal or multi-country trading systems with different regulatory
jurisdictions, such as the US and the Continent, there is the additional
challenge of decentralising the public-good aspects of security and capacity
adequacy. If this can be achieved, the benefits of trade and additional
competition are attractive. If they are poorly designed, then some forms of
regulation may not be internationally sustainable. A pessimistic scenario
would be that cross-border market power contagion will reinforce the
attractions of autarkic vertical integration. For the optimistic scenario of
unified electricity markets to work well, regulators will need to co-operate to
solve public-good problems and deal with market power. The US has the legal
power to do this, but not necessarily the economic understanding, while the
EU lacks both.
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